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1) Introduction: An Overview of Fourth Generation Logics
In fairly recent times, logicians have developed a profusion of
non-classical logics: many-valued, modal, temporal, fuzzy and so on.
Some of these logics, which I shall call "fourth generation logics,"
have already been developed and exploited by computer scientists. Tem-
poral logic has been used in AI and for the formal specification and
verification of concurrent programs. Many-valued logic has been used in
circuit design, and fuzzy logic in AI. In this paper I would like to
discuss an area of fourth generation logic, erotetic logic, that may
well be of use to computer scientists working AI and database theory.
I have coined the term "fourth generation logics" for two reasons.
First, while the more customary term for these logics is "deviant
logics," that phrase makes it sound as if people who do research on such
logics are somehow strange or weird. Second, the phrase "fourth genera-
tion" is at least roughly historically accurate.
We can distinguish generations of logic, in part on the basis of
time of origin. Following Bartley [3] and J«5rgensen [10], we can view
the first generation of logic as beginning with Aristotle in the fourth
century B.C.. First generation logic, "traditional" ("Aristotelian" or
"syllogistic") logic, focused upon reasoning in natural language.
Logicians were concerned to formulate rules for casting propositions into
categorical forms, and for assessing arguments ("syllogisms") built up
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out of those categorical propositions.
The second generation of logic, Boolean or algebraic logic, dates
from the work of George Boole (1847) and the work of DeMorgan, Venn,
Lewis Carroll, and others later in the nineteenth century. The second
generation logicians kept the earlier concern with natural language ar-
gumentation, but extended logic to cover a wider class of arguments
(ones involving relational propositions). More importantly, the alge-
braic logicians subtly shifted the focus of research to the application
of mathematics to logic. Graphical methods (Venn diagrams, Euler dia-
grams Carroll diagrams and so on) for assessing syllogisms were developed.,
and methods for expressing propositions algebraically were devised.
Thus the second generation logicians greatly expanded on the scope
of analysis beyond traditional syllogistic, and greatly increased the
formalization of logic. They also were concerned with devising tech-
niques for drawing relevant inferences from premises, i.e., with solving
problems or discovering solutions, as opposed to merely verifying the
correctness of already formulated proofs. This concern shows up in the
exercises found in second generation logic texts (such as Lewis Carroll's
Game of Logic ) : puzzles that call upon the student to determine what
information about some situation can be derived from given information.
(Vestiges of the second generation concern over logical puzzles are still
found in some elementary logic texts, and several modem logicians—most
notably E.R. Emmet and Raymond Smullyan--have written books of puzzles.)
Third generation logic is classical First Order Logic (hereafter
"POL") . While we might date the birth of POL with the publication of
Frege's Begriffschrift in 1879, it is more accurate to date the third
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generation in logic to the first decade of this century, when Russell
brought Frege's work to public notice. Eminent logicians such as Peirce,
Whitehead, Russell, Gc5del, Church, Gentzen and many others rapidly
developed FOL, with many major results in place by the 1930' s. Third
generation logic is concerned much less with argumentation in natural
language than with the foundations of mathematics and proof theory.
Hence the focus of research was on consistency proofs, axiomatization,
decision procedures and so on. Indeed, many third generation logicians
were avowed logicists
,
i.e., they wanted to reduce all of mathematics to
logic and set theory.
Fourth generation logic is harder to date. We might date it late
in the nineteenth century, with Peirce' s work on many-valued logic. It
would be more accurate, however, to fix the date in the 1920' s, and
1930' s, with the work of Lukasiewitz on three-valued logic and the work
of C.I. Lewis on strict entailment (modal logic). But in terms of pur-
pose, the difference between third and fourth generation is clear.
Fourth generation logicians are much less concerned with the foundations
of mathematics, and are once again concerend with reasoning and knowledge
expressed in natural language. Typically, the fourth generation logician
feels that FOL is inadequate to explicate some interesting feature of
rational discourse, and he seeks to find some modification of or replace-
ment for POL. The fourth generation logician has the same goal of the
first and second generation logicians, but wants to use some formal
apparatus in addition to (or in lieu of) FOL.
That POL does not sufficiently explicate all natural language
reasoning is by now conceded by most logicians. (Indeed, some logicians
have gone to the extreme of arguing that POL should not be taught as
"logic"— see, for example [18] pp. 447-456.) This is perhaps not sur-
prising: POL explicates mathematical reasoning well, but in mathematics
there is no cause and effect, before and after, or questioner and
respondent.
In any event, in the last forty years there has been a proliferation
of fourth generation logics. Even classifying them is controversial.
Some (such as Turner [20] and Haack [8]) have divided fourth generation
logics into those which seek to extend POL and those which seek to
replace it. For example, standard modal logic extends POL by adding
modal operators, but the theorems of POL remain valid. On the other
hand, many-valued and intuitionist logics replace POL in the sense that
various theorems of POL (e.g., the Law of Excluded Middle) fail in those
logics.
I find that distinction unhelpful. To begin with, modal logics are
many-valued in that they add a third truth value (necessary truth) to the
classical values (true and false). More generally, logics don't seek to
do anything: logicians do. And most fourth generation logicians don't
seek to replace POL; like scientists in other fields, they view conserva-
tionist) as a virtue in a theory. That is, faced with two new proposed
theories which aim to succeed where an established theory has failed sci-
entists will naturally choose the one that least conflicts with the
established theory (all things being equal). A fourth generation logi-
cian doesn't seek to replace POL- -he may be driven to it, but he doesn't
seek it.
It may be suggested that I have misconstrued the proposed division.
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The point is (it might be urged) that some alternate logics accept as
theorems the theorems of FOL, and some do not. But this seems to be an
unhelpful point. Many of those logics in which some classical theorems
fail have analogues which replace the failed theorems- -for example, while
the Law of Excluded Middle fails in a three-valued logic, the Law of
Excluded Fourth may still hold.
I suggest, then, that a more interesting division of fourth genera-
tion logic is between assertoric logics (those that concern logical
connections between statements) and nonassertoric logics (those concerned
with questions, commands, and such like). Some of the major types of
fourth generation logic are listed below.
FOURTH GENERATION LOGICS
Nonclassical
Assertoric
Question
logics
Imperative
logics
Dialogue
logics
Many-valued Modal
,
Relatedness Fuzzy and Otner
logics (in- Temporal
,
and nonmonotonic (epistemic
cludes Quantum and Causal Entailment logics logics, free
logics) logics
-
logics logics, etc.)
Intuitionist
logics
Several references are worth noting. [7] has a good survey of
fourth generation logics and the issues surrounding them from the philo-
sopher's point of view, while [19] has a survey of temporal, many-valued
and fuzzy logic from the AI point of view. The classic survey of modal
logic is [7] (updated by [8]). A fine survey of many-valued logic is [15]
and of temporal logic is [16]. AI researchers are currently exploring
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the potential of relevance logic, and the Bible of such logics is [1],
A fourth generation logic that is unfamiliar to many computer sci-
entists is erotetic logic.
Roughly put, erotetic logic is the logic of questions. More
precisely, if standard logic (assertoric logic) involves explicating
statements and the relations between statements, erotetic logic is the
extension of assertoric logic to explicate questions and the relations
between questions and answers. By "explicate questions" I mean reveal
the structure of questions in a way analogous to the way assertoric logic
explicates the structure of statements. For example, in standard POL the
two relational sentences "John loves Mary" and "Mary is loved by John"
are symbolized the same way ("Loves (John, Mary)") because while the sur-
face structures of the English declaratives differ, the semantic struc-
tures of the statements are the same. Similarly, an adequate erotetic
logic should symbolize
(la) What are the good restaurants in Topeka?
(lb) Which Topeka restaurants are good?
the same, because while the surface structures of the English interro-
gatives differ, the semantic structures of the questions are the same.
Again, just as an assertoric logic categorizes statements (as being
conditionals, negations, existential ly quantified or whatever), an
adequate erotetic logic should be able to categorize questions, and
reveal the differences between:
(la) What are the good restaurants in Topeka?
(2) What are some good restaurants in Topeka?
(3) What is a good restaurant in Topeka?
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(4) Why are there no good restaurants in Topeka?
(5) Why do you say that there are no good restaurants in Topeka?
(6) Is The Loft a good Topeka restaurant?
(7) Where is The Loft located?
By "explicate the relation between questions and answers" I mean the
formulation of rules governing the acceptability of a given answer to a
given question. For example, question (la) admits the answer "The Loft
and the Amarillo Grill are the only good restaurants in Topeka," while
none of the others do. Crucial here is the notion of a direct answer, an
answer which supplies the requested information, but no more. That is
why "The Loft and the Amarillo Grill are the only good restaurants in
Topeka" is not an acceptable answer to (3) , because (3) only requests one
example of a good restaurant in Topeka, not a complete list.
Thus to construct an adequate erotetic logic we must do three
things. First, we must decide upon a typology of questions. Second, we
must develop a formal system- -presumably an extension of some formal
assertoric logic--which will allow us to symbolize questions. Third, we
must formulate a set of admission rules, i.e., rules that specify the
syntactic form of an acceptable answer to a given type of question.
Developing a typology of questions requires considerable work--
mainly of a philosophic and linguistic nature. There is a large body of
literature on this topic (see the bibliography to [5]). To simplify the
issues treated in this paper, we will adopt the following typology:
QUESTIONS
""why~~~^"~ How
Compound
Whether Which
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Whether-questions : These questions present their subjects (their range
of alternatives) explicitly and request the respondent to select from
among them. Example:
(8) Is Fred rich?
(9) Which should Fred take: FORTRAN, COBOL, Pascal or BASIC?
(8) presents the alternatives "Fred is rich" and "Fred is not rich,"
while (9) presents the alternatives "Fred should take FORTRAN," "Fred
should take COBOL," "Fred should take Pascal," and "Fred should take
BASIC."
Which-questions : These questions present their subjects by means of
statement functions, and request the respondent to select the data satis
fying those functions. Examples:
(10) Which cars are expensive?
(11) Who will come to the party?
(12) What are Fred's office hours?
(10) presents the subject by means of the proposition function "x is a
car and x is expensive," (11) by "x is a person and x will come to the
party, and (12) by "x is an office hour of Fred."
Why-questions : These questions are of two sorts. The first sort of why
question is a request of the respondent to explain an acknowledged fact.
Examples
:
(13) What is the cause of the oversupply of Ph.D.'s?
(14) Why do dogs bark?
The second sort of why-question is a request of the respondent to prove
a point that the questioner doubts. Examples:
(15) Why do you say that Fred is unhappy?
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(16) What are his reasons for buying that stock?
The topic of why-questions is important in philosophy of science,
and will probably become important in AI; however, it is not relevant to
this paper.
How-questions : These questions also are of two sorts. The first sort
request of the respondent a set of instructions. Examples:
(17) How do I get to Oklahoma City?
(18) How can we buy a new car?
The second sort of how question is a request for the respondent to
impart a skill. Examples:
(19) Can you show me the fox-trot?
(20) Do you know how to get this bottle-cap off?
Again, while the topic of how-questions is interesting and poten-
tially relevant to AI, it is not relevant here.
Compound questions : Questions, like statements, can be compound.
Examples
:
(21) Who is that masked man, and what does he want?
(22) Where and when shall we get together?
Questions can be compounded with statements:
(23) If Fred wants to buy a car, where will he get the money?
In this paper we will not pursue the topic of compound questions."
Qlk stions that are truth-functionally compounded together we can handle
in an obvious way. For example, an acceptable answer to (22) would sim-
ply be a conjunction of ac ptable answers to "Where will we get toge-
ther?" and "When will we together?" Mor ver, most cases in which
statements are compounded with quest' sec to be cases in which the
-10-
statement is a guard against presupposition failure. For example, we
would ask (23) rather than the simple question
(24) Where will Fred get the money to buy the car he wants?
because (24) presupposes that Fred wants to buy a car, and we may not be
sure that he does. But presupposition failure will be accounted for in
our treatment (below) of simple questions.
In short, the formal apparatus we develop will be geared toward
which-and whether-questions , as they seem to be the most crucial for
database theory (as opposed to AI or philosophy of science)
.
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2) A Formal Erotetic System
Having picked out the types of questions in which we are interested,
3
we now construct a formal system for putting those questions. Since a
formal erotetic language is an estension of an assertoric language, we
need first to lay out the grammar of that underlying logic. The language
we will take to be POL. The vocabulary (or "alphabet") consists of :
infinitely many variables: x, y, z, Xi, y-^, Zp...
individual constants: a, b, c,...
predicates of any arity: A, B, C,...
punctuation symbols: (, ), [, ], {, J
logical constants: -»( if then), & (and), V (universal quantifier),
3 (existential quantifier), v (or)
,
~ (not) ,<-+(if and only if)
In philosophic literature, predicates and constants are kept to one letter.
In computer science literature, predicates are often whole words (e. g.
"RESTAURANT (x)"). The difference is purely one of style, but for reada-
bility we prefer the computer science style.
The well-formed formulas are characterized as follows. We say that
variables and constants are terms . We say that an n-ary predicate fol-
lowed by n terms is an atomic formula P(t n ,...,t ). If all the t.'s arej 1' ' n l
constants (i.e., individual names), then P(t,,...,t ) is a ground atomic
formula (a "particular statement") . Then the set of well-formed formulas
(wffs) is the set defined by the rules:
(1) any atomic formula is a wff;
(2) if p is a wff, then so is ~p;
(3) if p and q are wffs, then so are p v q, p-»q, p<-*q, and p & q;
(4) is v is a variable and p a wff, then so is (yv)p and C3v)p;
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(5) no other expressions are wffs.
We don't need a full-blown first order language to formulate a data-
base. We say that a first-order language is a relational language if and
only if it has at least one but at most finitely many constants, it has
only finitely many predicates, has equality (denoted by 'x = y') as a
predicate, and has a set of "types." A type is a unary predicate t (a
simple type) or boolean combinations of simple type. (Types allow us to
capture the notion of the "domain" of a given relation).^
When types are defined we allow ourselves the luxury of type-
restricted quantifiers. We will use
(Vx/T ) A xx
l
to mean
(Vx) (T^-^Ax)
and
(ax/T ) A x
to mean
(3x) (TjX Sc A x)
In a standard way we can interpret the language L. An interpretation
M consists of a domain D of individuals over which the variables range, a
mapping f of the constants of the language onto individuals of D, and a
mapping E of the predicates of the language onto sets of tuples of indivi-
duals of the domain. We can then characterize truth or satisfiability
under M (written
\
s=
^) as follows. For a given mapping v of variables of
L into D, define another mapping r as follows:
r(c) = f(c) for every constant of L
r(x) = v(x) for every variable of L
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|*j-M as follows:
1) P(tp ...,tn ) iff (r( tl ),...,r(tn)) 6
E(P) for every
atomic formula of L.
2)
3)
j^jj- ~ A iff not4)
5)
6)
7)
\tm ai * a2 iff and
fr^i v A2 iff fete or tr^
(Al ->A2 ) iff f^(~Ax vA2 )
(A,*r* A iff
r,M 1 r,M
((A
1
A
2
) & (A
2
- A
1
))
-j (Vx) A iff for all deD p^*M A where r* is
identical to r except for mapping x to d
(Vk) ^ A8) |>£ 0k) A iff
Then we can define f**^ as: J
35
^ (read "A is true in interpretation
M") iff for a11 r
-
M is said to te a model for A if H^*
In interpreting a relational language, we stipulate that equality
hold of every individual in the domain, and we also stipulate a set of
integrity constraints. An integrity constraint for a predicate P has the
form (where Tp...,!^ are the types):
<yXl)...fcv [p (Xl ,...xn)-*(TlXl & ... &Txnf)
For exanple, we might lay down a constraint upon
Wife (x,y)
that x be a woman and y be a man:
Vx) (Vy) Qjife (x,y)—* (Woman(x) & Man(y))J
Now that we have the assertoric logic set forth, we turn to the
erotetic extension. Our goal to develop a formalism that will allow us
to specify what it is for a given statement to correctly answer a given
question. We wi.ll do this in two stages: first, we will devise a set of
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rules which govern the acceptability of answers, and then (in the next
section) we will state a criterion for truth of answers.
Following Belnap ([4] and [5]), whose term system we will adopt, we
view a question as having the form ?RS, where R is the request and S the
subject
.
Roughly defined, the request specifies the amount of information
desired, while the subject specifies the sort of information to be exam-
ined. The question mark we view as an operator which takes request-
subject pairs onto questions. A query is just a question applied to (or
"raised within") a database. In this section we will focus on represen-
ting questions without concern for databases; we will look at queries
later.
We discuss the subject S first. The subject of a whether-question
presents its range of alternatives explicitly. That is, the subject has
the form of a set of statements
V A2'*'- An
where none of the Ai's are repetitions or conjunctions solely of the
others of the set. For example, the subject of the question
Is John married?
is the pair
^John is married, John is not married1,
symbolically
^married (John) , ^ married (John)}
Again, the subject of
Has John stopped beating his wife?
is
{Has beaten_wife (John) & Now__beats_wife (John), Has_beaten-wife
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(John) & ~ Now_beats_wife (John)]}
A more elaborate example:
Which are on sale today: ham, turkey, or steak?
has the subject
4on_sale (ham, today), on_sale (turkey, today), on_sale (Steak,
The subject of a which-question presents a potentially infinite set
of alternatives, bymeans of statement functions, some of which are type
constraints and the others the matrix. For example, the question
Which Topeka restaurants take credit cards?
has as subject matrix
accepts (x, credit_cards) & located (x, Topeka)
and as type constraint
restaurant (x)
.
We will separate the subject types from the matrix by a souble slash:
[restaurant (x)//accepts (x, credit_cards) & located (x, Topeka)^
In general we can symbolize the subject of a which-question as
where < r. < n.
Note two things. First, we can push the type constraints over into
the matrix if we choose, although there is no good reason for doing so.
For example, the subject
^Woman(x), Man(y)//Wife(x,y)}
can be put equivalently
Woman(x)//Man(y) & Wife (x,y)
or even
[T
1
x,...,Tx
r
//A(x1'
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{e//Woman(x) & Man (y) 4 Wife (x,y$
where is the null symbol.
Second, note that the subject of a whether-question is a special
case of the subject of a which-question (and so whether-questions are
fghich-questions) • Consider the examples of whether-questions given
earlier. The subject of
Is John married?
is
^married (John) , married (John)J
which can be put, as the subject of a which-question
fe //(x = John) & Married (x)\
Again, the subject of
Has John stopped beating his wife?
can be put
i^//(x = John) & (stopped beating wife (x)}
We will take the view, then, that whether-questions are but a spe-
cial case of which-questions , and state our rules (governing the
acceptability of answers) in terms of which-questions only.^
The request of a question is a four-tuple <Rrange, Rcomplete,
Rdistinct, Rdefault>. The selection- size specification Rrange is a
specification on the lower and upper limits of the size of the selection.
The lower bound is some integer greater than or equal to one (any ques-
tion requests at least an alternative be selected) . The upper bound can
be any finite positive integer greater than or equal to the lower bound,
or may be ommited entirely (which we indicate by using the null symbol
"
6
") . Thus Rrange takes the form
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/. .u (1 < / < u)
/• .€(1<J).
The selection-size specification allows us to express the difft rence
between
What is the only Indian restaurant in Topeka?
and
What are some Indian restaurants in Topeka?
The first question involves a request for a single alternative, so
Rrange = 1..1, while the second question involves a request for at least
one alternative but sets no upper limit on the answer, so Rrange = l..£.
The second element of the request is the completeness
-
claim specifi-
cation Rcomplete. Some questions, like
Which Chinese restaurants in Topeka take credit cards?
implicitly require the respondent to make a claim that the list given is
complete, while other questions, like
What are some Chinese restaurants in Topeka which take credit cards?
do not. The completeness-claim is always a comparison of the number of
alternatives selected with the total number of true alternatives. The
completeness-claim could be that all the true alternatives have been
given, or all but one, or most, 01 10%, but in practice only one complete
ness-claim is important, namely, the claim that all true alternatives
have been given. This is an especially important claim if the database
is incomplete. Accordingly, we will stipulate that Rcomple:' take the
form of .ither V' or '6' depending upon \;hether the maximum completeness
claim (' ; t all true instances have been selected) is specified, or else
that no such claim is specified.
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The distinctness-claim specification Rdistinct is a specification
regarding whether or not the selection given contains any redundancies.
For example, the statement
The Greenhouse and the Holiday Inn South restaurant are restaurants
in Topeka.
would in most situations not be an acceptable answer to the question
What are two different restaurants in Topeka?
if it turns out that "The Greenhouse" is in fact just the name given to
the restaurant in the Holiday Inn South.
As with completeness-claims, various sorts of distinctness-claims
are theoretically possible (that some of the alternatives are distinct,
that all but one are, and so on) but in practice only two are important.
We will say Rdistinct has the form 'V" or "e", depending upon whether the
answer is to include a claim that all the alternatives are distinct or
whether no such claim is to be made. In most cases in ordinary contexts
and with most databases, questions and queries assume that the selection
given in response consists of entirely distinct individuals.
The final element of the request is the default specification
Rdefault. Rdefault specifies what is to be done in the face of presup-
position failure. A presupposition of a question is any statement that
must be true if that question is to have any true direct answer. For
example
,
Has John stopped beating his wife?
takes as direct answers
John has stopped beating his wife.
and
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John has not stopped beating his wife.
But for one of those alternatives to be true, it has to be true that he
Q
has beaten his wife. Of course, this example is the classic example of
a loaded question: whether John answers yes or not, he commits himself
to the proposition that he has beaten his wife in the past. Questions
that presuppose something false are called "loaded," and are best an-
swered by a direct answer but a corrective answer (one that corrects
false presupposition) . Examples:
(question) Has John stopped beating his wife?
(direct answer) Yes.
(corrective answer) He has never beaten his wife,
(question) What is an Indian restaurant in Topeka?
(direct answer) The New Dehli Deli.
(corrective answer) There are no Indian restaurants in Topeka.
We will take the position that a person may well desire a corrective
answer to his question if he cannot be given a direct answer—indeed,
this seems to be the rule rather than the exception. We can allow the
request for a correction in case of presupposition failure by indicating
a default question D. (The guard question cannot, of course, be identi-
cal to the original question.) For example, the question
What is an Indian restaurant in Topeka?
can be guarded by the default question
Is there an Indian restaurant in Topeka?
The null symbol indicates that no default question is specified--we may
suppose that an error message is printed in case of presupposition fail-
ure.
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Here then are a few examples of questions and their formal expres-
sions.
(1) Is Hunam a restaurant?
?(l..l,e ,6 ,€) ir//(x = Hunam) & Restaurant (x)^
or
,
f ,f )^ Restaurant (x)//x = Hunam'J
If "Restaurant" is a type.
(2) Which of these are (different) Chinese restaurants: Hunam, The
Peking Duck, and Solley's?
?(1..€
,
V, ^, € ) ^Restaurant (x) //Chinese (x) & [(x = Hunam)
v (x = The_Peking_Duck) v (x = Solley's)]^
(3) Which if any of these are (different) Chinese restaurants:
Hunam, The Peking Duck, and Solley's?
?(l..f, V, +, D) [^Restaurant (x) //Chinese (x) & ( (x - Hunam)
v (x = The Peking_Duck) v (x = Solley's))]
where
D = ?(l..l,
€ ,€ ,€) ^(Restaurant (Hunam) & Chinese (Hunam)) v
(Restaurant (The__Peking_Duck) & Chinese (The _Peking_Duck) ) v
(Restaurant (Solley's) & (Chinese (Solley's))^
(4) What are two (different) Greek restaurants in Topeka?
?(2.. £, f,€ ) : Restaurant (x) //Greek(x) & Located (x, Topeka)^
By making the exact form of the request and the subject explicit,we
can formulate rules governing the form any acceptable answer to a given
question must have. We will state these rules recursively. The first
set of specific rules apply to questions without default questions speci-
fied. We then state a general rule that applies to any questions with a
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default question specified. In what follows, If will represent the qu
tion and K the answer.
First, consider a which-question that . pecifies a size range but
specifies neither a completeness claim nor . Lstinctnuss claim. Then
the constraint on any answer is that it be a injunction of instances of
the type constraints and matrix. Formally,
Rule 1 if/C us
H£..u,€ t Tlxl Trxr//A>;r*' xni
then oC must be
)
(T,a, &...&Ta, & Aa, ...a, ) &...& (T,a &...&Ta & Aa
'
1 h r \ h n 1 s l r b r s l n
j£ < s <u
Example
:
What is an example of a friendly bear?
Rule 1 allows
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is friendly,
but does not allow
Yogi is not a bear and Yogi is friendly,
nor does it allow
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is not friendly.
Next, consider a which-question that specifies a selection size
range and a completeness-claim. Then any acceptable answer must involve
a conjunction where each conjunct satisfies the type and matrix condi-
tions and where the number of conjuncts falls in the range indicated, and
a claim that if any individuals satisfy the type and matrix conditions
they are identical to the ones cited. Formally:
-22-
Rule 2 If K. is of the form
?<X.u,V,e,€) t^Xp..., Trxr//Axr ..xn]
then oC must be
{ [T,a, *...T a, &Aa1 ...a1 &. . .& T,a T,a & Aa ...a ]
&^xr ..Vxn [(TlXl Txr ) -> (Axx ...xn-^ ((s1?n= a^^)
v *-- v (x
l,n
= a
sr n)))]]
where (x n = a, ) is the conjunction (x-, = a, ) (x = a, ) andl,n k1>n 1 kj n kn
^ < s < n. We could also state the completeness-claim using type-
restricted quantifiers:
<yx
1
/T
1
>...<V'vTr) (fx^)...*^) I*»1...V*«»l^lltn)v...v
(x-, =a v v ]l,n s,,n))
Example
:
Which bears are friendly?
Rule 1 sanctions
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is friendly and for any x, if x is a bear
then if x is friendly then x is identical to Yogi,
but does not sanction
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is friendly.
Next, consider a which-question that specifies a selection-size
range and a distinctness-claim, but no completeness-claim. Then an ac-
ceptable answer will assert a conjunction where each conjunct satisfies
the type and matrix conditions and where the number of conjuncts falls in
the specified range and where an assertion is made that no two indivi-
duals cited are the same. Formally:
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Rule 3: If /d- has the form
HJ..U. e , [ Tlxr ...,
T
r
x
r
//A
xi
...x^
then oC must have the form
\ [T,a, &...&Ta, & Aa, ...a, &...&T, &...&T, &Aa o ...ac ]» i ii r l It i la ia s-i s_
1 r 1 n s-^ s
r
1 n
& t&(l<i< j <p) V <l<k<n)
Where ^< s < u and where V, . , . v (a. ^ a. ) abbreviates (a. ^U 5 k <. n; i^ i^
a. ) v...v (a. ^ a. ), i.e., the statement that the ith and ith con-
J l n Jn
junets are distinct, and so the full claim that all conjuncts are dis-
tinct will look like £ (1 < i < j < p) V (1 < k < n) (a. , ). So,
R \
for example, to say that the list (11, 13, 17) is not redundant is to say
(11 + 13) and (11 + 17) and (13 + 17). Also, to say that the list of
pairs ((1,2)
,
(1,3)
,
(3,4)) is not redundant is just to say {[(1 =h 1) v (2
* 3)] % [Q * 3) v (2 t 4)] £ [(1 + 3) v (3^4)]].
Example
:
Which different bears are friendly?
Rule 3 accepts
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is friendly and Winnie is a bear and Winnie
is friendly and Yogi is not identical to Winnie,
but does not accept
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is friendly and Winnie is a bear and Winnie
is friendly.
Finally, consider a which-question that specifies a size range,
completeness-claim, and distinctness-claim. Then the form of the answer
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is just the fusion of the two rules above.
Rule 4: If K, has the form
?<j£..U,V, T
1
x
1
,...,T
r
x
r
//Ax
1
...x
n
then oi must be of the form
f [T,a, T a, & Aa, ...a, &...&T,a &...& T a &Aa ...a ]
1
r J
r
X
l n
1 s
l r
s
l
s
n
%\iV^) [<TlXl S...iW^\»>b^
lnV v-" v
(x, =a )))]&[ £<1 < i < i <f) V (1 < k < n) (a. + a. >]"!i,n s,n -- — - --' - k ^
£ < s < u.
Example: Which different bears are friendly?
Rule 4 sanctions:
Yogi is a bear and Yogi is friendly and Winnie is a bear and
Winnie is friendly and for any x, if x is a bear then if x is
friendly then either x is identical to Yogi or x is identical to
Winnie, and Yogi is not identical to Winnie.
So much for questions that do not involve a default specification.
Questions that do specify a default question can be handled easily.
Rule 5: Let Kg be a question involving a specified default question S
and let be the same question without a default specification. Then
any acceptable answer CC to Kg will have the form 0(, or O^, where0((is
an acceptable answer to fC6 snd is an acceptable answer to &~ .
Example:
What (if any) is an Indian restaurant in Topeka?
Rule 5 allows
The New Dehli Deli
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and
There are no Indian restaurants in Topeka
but not
<error>
The granmar of elementary questions, then, consists of POL plus a
new operator"?," a few obvious additional rules of construction (for the
various particular forms of "?<Rrange, Rcomplete, Rdistinct, Rdefault>
S'])and five rules governing the acceptability of answers. These latter
rules are the heart of the subject, of course; they are perhaps remini-
scent of rule of inference or transformation in POL itself, but, of
course, are not to be considered as such. They are better called "rules
of response," rules which govern, not how information is to be trans-
formed, but how (in what form) it is to be conveyed.
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3) Formal Queries
We now have an apparatus for specifying questions exactly. This
apparatus allows us to get a start on the formal specification of the
correctness of answers. An answer to a given question is correct if and
only if: (a) it has acceptable form and (b) it is true. And we can now
specify (by rules 1-5) what it is for an answer to have an acceptable
form. We now want to specify formally what it is for an answer to be
true.
Here databases enter the picture. We take the view that answers are
true or false only against the backdrop of some body of information, some
database. And so if we are to develop some formal account of truth
rela ve to a database, we need to develop some formal model of data-
bases .
Reiter [15] contrasts two ways to formally represent databases. The
first he calls the "model theoretic" view, the dominant view since the
work of Codd and others in the early 70' s. The second he calls the
"proof theoretic" view. Reiter argues that the proof theoretic view is
better in that it naturally allows for the representation of disjunctive
information, null values, general facts, events, property inheritance
(IS-A) hierarchies, and other "world knowledge." I find his arguments
persuasive, but will not rehearse them here. Rather, I will work with
the proof-theoretic model because it very nicely compliments the erot Lc
apparatus outlined earlier.
Under the proof theoretic \ Lew, a data base is taken to be a first
order theory (in an underlying first order relational language). A first
order theory £" of language L is just a subset of the well formed
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formulas of L. For example, with FOL as defined earlier, we might have
a first order theory twith ground atomic formulas:
V = j_Restaurant (Hunam) , Restaurant (The_Peking_Duck) , Restaurant
(The_ New _Dehli_Deli) , Chinese (Huna,), Chinese (The_ Peking__Duck)
,
Indian (The_ New Dehli Deli) , Located (Huna, Topeka), Located
(The__Peking_Duck, Topeka), Located (The_New_Dehli Deli, Topeka),
Hunam=Hunam, The_New_Dehli_Deli=The_New_Dehli_Deli, TheJPeking_ Duck
=The_Peking__Duck, Topeka = Topeka^
We can then express truth with respect to the database in terms of
derivability:
t h<*-
means that oi is derivable from V taken as a set of premises. In our
example above, clearly
TT f-Restaurant (Hunam)
i.e., the fact that Hunam is a restaurant is derivable from the database-
-
trivially, since it is an explicit member of the set. Less trivially,
Qx) (Chinese (x) & Restaurant (x) & Located (x, Topeka))
i.e., we can derive from the theory that there is at least one Chinese
restaurant in Topeka. We can now try a plausible approach to defining
what it is for an answer oL to a query K- applied to a database?" to be
true: is true with respect to K. if and only if T"h^C . More generally,
a given question K applied to a database V is cOT^ecJtlj_an_s^r_ed by OL
if and only if (a) oC is of acceptable form as an answer to K (i.e., meets
rules 1-5) and (b) fh*.
Let's follow this suggestion to see where it leads. Suppose we ask
(of our sample database)
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Which restaurants in Topeka are Indian restaurants?
The correct answer should be
(Restaurant (The_New_Dehli_Deli) & Indian (The_New_Dehli_Deli) &
Located (TheJfew JJehli Deli, Topeka)) & (Vx) [(Restaurant (x) &
Indian (x) & Located (x, Topeka)) -» (x = The_New_Dehli_Deli) 1
But vMleth (Restaurant (The _New_Dehli Deli) & Indian (The__New_Dehli
_
Deli) & Located (The__Nev7_ Dehli._Deli
,
Topeka) ) , we cannot derive the
completeness-claim (Vx) [ (Restaurant (x) & IndiaN (x) & Located (x,
Topeka)) —» (x = The_New_D^hli_Deli) ] . Since universal clarr.s cannot be
derived from a theory consisting solely of ground atomic formulas, Reiter
suggests first adding to T"a domain closure axiom to the effect that all
individuals in the interpretation are named in the database. In the
example above, this axiom has the form:
(Vx) [ (x = Hunam) v (x = The_Peking_Duck) v (x = The_New_Dehli_Deli)
v ( x = Topeka)]
More generally, if the domain of the interpretation is (d-^,...,d ) the
domain closure axiom is:
(Vx) ((x = dj_) v ... v (x = d
n
))
Also, we must add to completion axioms for each predicate (to allow
the derivability of negations such as Restaurant (Topeka) . In our
small example:
(Vx) [Restaurant (x)-^ ((x = Hunam) v (x = The_Peking_Duck) v (x =
The_New_Dehli_Deli)
]
(Vx) [Indian (x)—> (x = The_New_Dehli_Deli) ]
(Vx) [Chinese (x) —> ( (x = Hunam) v (x - The Peking_Duck) ) ]
(Vx) {Vy) [Located (x,y)—» ( ( (x—> Hunam) v (x = The_New_Dehli_Deli)v
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(x = The. Peking _Duck) & (y = Topeka)))]
Happily, this all accords with out intuitions: to correctly answer a
question that demands a completeness-claim, we have to know that the
database to which the question is addressed is complete.
Again, suppose that we ask of our sample database
What are two different Chinese restaurants in Topeka?
The correct answer should be
(Chinese (Hunam) & Restaurant (Hunam) & Located (Hunam, Topeka)) &
(Chinese (The_Peking_Duck) & Restaurant (The__Peking_Duck) & Located
(The_Peking Duck, Topeka)) & ~ (Hunam = The_Peking_Duck)
But from , even including the closure and completion axioms, we cannot
derive the distinctness-claim
~ (Hunam = The_Peking_Duck)
We need to add more axioms to , namely, unique name axioms
~(c
±
= c.)
for all (C, C.\ i f i, in the set of constants of our relational lan-i 3 }
guage. When those axioms are added, the distinctness claim is derivable.
But again this accords well with our intuitions. To answer correct-
ly a question that demands a distinctness claim, we have to know that our
database contains no duplicate names. This is standardly assumed about
databases in practice, and it is a very nice result that our formal
specification mechanism forces us to make that assumption explicit.
When T consists of the ground atomic formulas^ domain closure axiom,
unique name axioms, completion axioms (and equality axioms specifying
the reflexibility, transitivity and symmetry of the equality predicate),
the only model for is the original interpretation, and thus truth in
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the interpretation amounts to provability in the theory. This completes
our definition of correctness of answers to queries.
4) Conclusion
I have argued above that a relatively unnoticed area of fourth-gen-
eration logic, erotetic logic, devised by philosophical logicians over
the last thirty years or so, can be used to complement database theory.
In particular, erotetic logic complements very nicely the approach to
representing databases taken by Reiter and other workers in the area of
the domain calculus, enabling us to formally represent questions and the
correctness of answers.
Of course, I suspect that there are other benefits to employing
erotetic logic in database theory. One area of possible interest is the
verification of relational database queries. That is, given a question
posed in natural language, we may be able to verify that a query posed
in one of the relational database query languages (domain algebra, domain
calculus, transform languages such as SEQUEL/SQL, or graphic systems such
as Query-By-Example) will correctly answer the question. For example, to
verify that
Which Chinese restaurants in Topeka take credit cards?
will be correctly answered by the SEQUEL query
SELECT NAME
FROM RESTAURANT
WHERE TYPE=' CHINESE'
AND CREDIT = 'YES'
AND LOCATION = 'TOPEKA'
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applied to a database containing the relation
RESTAURANT (NAME, LOCATION, TYPE, CREDIT)
we need to verify that
7(1. y ,€ , fe ) \ Restaurant (x)/ /Chinese (x) & Located (x, Topeka)
& takes_credit cards (x)J
will be correctly answered by the query commands. Assuming that the
implementation of the select command has been verified (it is presumably
just a linear search routine, which can be verified in the standard way),
we can show that the query will produce a complete list of names that fit
the matrix and type constraints. However, we still need to conjoin the
completeness-claim explicitly since it is not present as a datum in the
relational database. The point here is that Reiter's view of a database
as a first order theory is not something we can immediately implement in
a standard relational database. A suggestion worth pursuing is that
Reiter's view be implemented in PROLOG. After all, PROLOG does allow
the inclusion of general rules as well as particular facts in the data-
base.
In addition, AI researchers may find erotetic logic useful. Gen-
erally, erotetic logic gives us a handle on an important aspect of
natural language, viz., the asking and answering of questions. More
specifically, a number of philosophers of science have pointed out the
central role why-questions play in scientific research (see esp. [20]).
Besides "capturing" (i.e., representing) world knowledge, we need to
understand the various and intricate ways people interrogate that
knowledge. Erotetic logic can help us in that quest.
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NOTES
Logicians vary in their enthusiasm for fourth generation logic,
from unbridled enthusiasm to skepticism (even outright hostility) . Typ-
ical of the enthusiasts is Routley:
On the whole there has been far too much effort expended
on trying to accommodate philosophical clarifications to
going logical systems and strait jackets. . .rather than
trying to develop logical systems to handle the evident
data and to deal with going philosophical problems.
Classical logic (i.e., POL), although once and briefly
an instrument of liberation and clarification in philoso-
phy and mathematics, has, in becoming entrenched, become
rigid, resistant to change and highly conservative, and
so has become an oppressive and stultifying influence. . .
.
Classical logic is, as now enforced, a reactionary doc-
trine.
Routley quoted in Brodie,
et. al. 1984, p. 143
Routley touches upon one of the yniitv arguments employed by many fourth
generation logicians: that logic ought to be "empirical," that is,
should square with the facts of cognitive life. And fourth generation
logicians argue that POL is not empirically adequate.
Many logicians are skeptical, however. Quine ([13] p. 86) is only
one of many who resist the move to go beyond POL:
...let us not underestimate the price of a deviant logic.
There is a serious loss of simplicity... And there is a
loss, still more serious, on the score of familiarity....
The price is perhaps not quite prohibitive, but the returns
had better be good.
Those who are reluctant to embrace fourth generation logic seem to me
to have two basic objects: first, that the newer logics are not exten-
sional (hence lack many nice features present in POL, which is exten-
sionalist)
;
second, that the newer logics are proliferating, yet don't
fit together well (hence lack the elegance and simplicity of POL) . Let
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me elaborate.
We say that a logical expression is extensional if and only if
coreferential expressions can be substituted without changing the truth
value. (That means replacing singular terms with terms of the same
denotation (e.g., 'Mark Twain' and 'Sam Clemens'), predicates with
predicates of the same extension (e.g., 'man' and 'featherless biped'),
or sentences with sentences of the same truth value,) VJhile POL is ex-
tensional, fourth generation assertoric logics are typically intensional
(i.e., non-extensional) . Thus they often lack the simple decision pro-
cedures found in classical prepositional logic.
And again, fourth generation logics are bewildering, in their vari-
ety. Some seem to be more extensions of POL than replacements, others
seem to be wholesale replacements. It is quite unclear whether they
all can be fitted together, and if so, just how.
2
The reader may wish to see Belnap and Steele's discussion of com-
pound questions F5] pp. 87-107.
3
This system is similar to thai; of Belnap and Steele [53 which
grew out of Belnap's earlier work [4] with a number of simplifications
and modifications.. In particular, I view whether-questions as special
cases of which-questions and I build default questions (guards) into the
specification of simple questions. I do this to being the symbolism
closer to actual database queries. (The reader may wish to read the
alternate system devised by Aquist [2] . For an elegant and highly
formal account, see Kubinski [11].)
4
For a review of POL, see [12] or [17]. In particular, the notion
of interpreting a first order language is discusses in Chapter Two of
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[12] and Chapter Two of [17].
^Types are discusses in [17] pp. 88-92; and also in [14]. Note
that instead of using types, one can use a many-sorted logic to the
same effect. For an explanation of the role of category or type condi-
tions in erotetic logic, see Belnap [4] pp. 72-73.
We can do the converse, i.e., push matrix conjuncts over into the
type constraints, only if those conjuncts are types or if we are willing
to allow new types to be created at will-not a very practical approach.
^This formal reduction can have a cost in simplicity. For example,
the subject of the whether-question
Which of the following are on sale: ham, chicken, steak, lobster,
and turkey?
is
£_(on_sale (ham, today), on_sale (chicken, today, on_sale (steak,
today), on_sale (lobster, today), on_sale (turkey, today) )^
but turned into the subject of a whether-question is
jV //on_sale (x, today) & ((x = ham) v (x = chicken) v (x = steak)
v (x = lobster) v (x = turkey) )1
which is rather more awkward.
Even more awkward are questions involving quantified statements,
e.g. the subject of
Are all swans white?
is
[(*x) (swan(x) —»white (x)
,
(Vx) ( swan (x)-> white (x)^
That can only be represented as the subject of a which-question if we
use a universal type U% true of all individuals (or if dealing with a
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language with no types, the function Axv ~ Ax will serve as well). Then
the equivalent subject is
This point is more subtle if we interpret the question as a
whether-question
:
£6 // (x = John) & has _beaten_wife (John) & now_beats_wife (John)^>
Posing the question with that subject gets as direct answers
Has beaten_wife (John) & now beats wife (John)
and
[has_beaten_wife (John) & now beats^ wife (John) ]
That latter alternative does not logically imply that John did beat his
wife. However, it is still true under this construal that to answer
"Has John stopped beating his wife?" by "no, it is not the case that he
has stopped beating his wife" does not correct the presupposition of the
question.
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Several nonstandard logics (including many-valued,
temporal and fuzzy logics) have been usefully applied by
computer scientists. In this paper, erotetic logic—the
logic of questions— is reviewed, and its use in the speci-
fication and verification of database queries is explored.
Erotetic logic is classified as a nonassertoric fourth
generation logic in § 1 of the paper. In § 2 , a formal
erotetic logic is described. In §3, the logic is explored
as a tool for precisely stating database queries and for
specifying the correctness of answers. In§^, the possi-
bility of using the erotetic system for verifying query
functions is briefly discussed, and some general conclu-
sions drawn.
